滕彪文集
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滕彪文集
·What It's Like To Live With A Foot In China, Another In The U.S.
·E se Tiananmen fosse agora? Entrevista a quatro ativistas chineses
·China Since Tiananmen: Not a Dream but a Nightmare
·How the Tiananmen Square Massacre Changed China Forever
·Human Rights Lawyer Fled China But Still Feels Its Influence
·HOW HAS CHINA CHANGED POLITICALLY SINCE THE ICONIC STUDENT PROTESTS?
·六四30周年 陸民運人士盼世界助中國民主化
·貿易掛鉤中國人權 西方提聯合戰略
·蔡英文總統會見華人民主書院訪賓
·習近平体制は史上初のハイテク・ファシズム
·Remembering Tiananmen/Straits Times
·自由不是一個禮物,而是一個任務
·世界における民主主義の後退と市民社会
·中國流亡律師滕彪勉「反送中」別退卻
·中國當局拒延維權律師的執照/BBC
·打到中共要害 各國應效仿
·‘I cannot be silent, and I cannot give up’
·China’s Privileging of “Mr. Science” over “Mr. Democracy”
·Don’t Aid and Abet China’s Surveillance State
·在台北616“反送中”集會上的演講
·湖南“校园操场埋尸案”揭示了什么?
·TIBET CAMPAIGNERS LAUD SUCCESS AFTER GOOGLE CONFIRMS: “NO PLANS TO OF
·Teng Biao’s Statement at a media briefing against Google’s Project D
·香港「一國兩制」為何變了調?
·从天安门到香港
·short-term benefits vs. universal values
·Censorship is closing China's young minds
·江天勇李文足連線台北 感謝關注中國律師處境
·臺律師人權界聲援為法輪功辯護六律師
·「綏靖政策」與「惠台政策」的反思
·第三屆中國人權律師節 唐荊陵獲獎
·第二届中国人权律师奖颁奖辞
·「709事件」四週年 中國法治嚴重滑坡
·709四周年:中国法治恶化 香港反弹
· 709大抓捕对维权律师是一个“清洗”
·"Alle sind vorsichtiger geworden"
·中共用校園“七不講”窒息年輕人
·【30張影像、30個故事 — 六四30週年座談會】
·中共的网络主权论与世界人权宣言
·中共指使黑帮祸害香港
·外國企業在中國助紂為虐應充分重視
·新疆模式扩大 粤公安采集「口水样本」 监控时代 2.0来临
·Guangdong Police Take Saliva Samples Amid Fears of Nationwide DNA Prog
·人权活动家接受自由之家采访 见证法轮功反迫害20年历程
·香港下一步 可能從打人變成打死人
·追寻高智晟
·“The Bravest Lawyer in China” – Gao Zhisheng
·L’AVOCAT LE PLUS COURAGEUX DE CHINE
·人權律師建議 以2022北京冬奧向中共施壓
·反送中與六四
·大陆网军抹黑香港示威者 推特和脸书暂停大量中国帐号
·"Ce totalitarisme high tech est sans précédent"
·Disparitions forcées en Chine : un système rodé et institutionnalis
·Disappearing in China
·中共或採取化整為零的屠殺方式嚇退香港抗爭者
·Cambridge Forum 911
· ‘I thought they might kill me’
·China: Arrests, Disappearances Require International Response/HRW
·报道香港抗议持「中共立场」 中国环球电视网遭英监管机构调查
·"El régimen dictatorial de China no durará mucho más"
·The West needs 'collective action' to push China on human rights: expe
·在茉莉花电视谈 “中国国难与香港抗争”
·禁蒙面法会不会让暴力升级?“一国一制”正在悄然实行?
·香港危局破解 中国高科技极权主义
·Decoding the cracks in the Chinese model
·大陆民族情绪泛滥 《灌篮高手》作者挺港运遭网民封杀/RFA
·中共有关香港抗议的宣传战略及局限
·国庆还是国难
·關於香港事態的緊急聲明
·香港运动延烧 大陆人发声为何那么难?
·Newts World: China's rule
·伊力哈木 - 无法祝贺的生日与萨哈罗夫奖
·Tiananmen Massacre, the China Model and the formation of China’s Hig
·茉莉:专制下的“黑色花卉”
·比利时一孔子学院院长涉间谍行为 被禁进入比利时和申根区
·Broken Harmony: China’s Dissidents
·香港廢青與中國小粉紅
·柏林墙的倒塌与“信息柏林墙”的建立
·Panopticism with Chinese Characteristics
·当今中国禁忌话题:猪瘟、猪头、习近平领导能力/VOA
·哥大取消中国人权研讨会
·FREE SPEECH IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES UNDER ATTACK FROM BEIJING
·懼於中國「粉紅軍團」威脅抗議 哥倫比亞大學取消講座
·Columbia U. cancels panel on Communist China’s human rights violation
·Columbia U. Canceled an Event on Chinese Human-Rights Violations. Orga
·人大怒斥香港高院 司法还能独立吗?/VOA
·Why did Columbia cancel Chinese rights violations event?
·The Pros and Cons of US Universities Operating Campuses and Centers in
·中国打组合拳反制美国 美国NGO躺枪
·美国大学生指控「抖音」海外版 窃取用户数据并传回中国
·国际人权日:不放弃的香港青年示威者
· Ilham Tohti's Sakhrov Prize 2019
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·瑞典国会议员要求将中国驻瑞典大使桂从友驱逐出境
·A New Online Game Allows Players to Attack Hong Kong’s Protestors
·花千芳为母维权引群嘲 中共养老金无底洞再聚焦
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Don’t Aid and Abet China’s Surveillance State

Don’t Aid and Abet China’s Surveillance State
   
   by YVONNE CHIU|
   https://www.lawliberty.org/liberty-forum/dont-aid-and-abet-chinas-surveillance-state/
   

   
   In response to: China Since Tiananmen: Not a Dream but a Nightmare
   Beijing's Tiananmen Square (image: Ablakat / shutterstock.com)
   
   
   Thirty years on from the ill-fated student protests for greater democratic participation and government accountability in Tiananmen Square, it is appropriate to sound the alarm about China’s foreseeable future, as the serious tensions there will be difficult to reconcile peaceably. Teng Biao is right that without the tightening of authoritarian rule, there would have been no Chinese economic miracle. The picture is even bleaker, however, because not only is the tradeoff substantial, but the payoff is not as great as it seems.
   
   First, the cost of this economic prosperity in human rights, basic civil liberties and protections, and the rule of law is enormous, as Teng Biao notes in his Liberty Forum essay. More disturbingly, much of that cost is being paid voluntarily, as the Chinese Communist Party has grown very clever in how it combines its use of the stick and the carrot.
   
   The gulags are still alive and well in the form of political imprisonment and “reeducation” camps, and China has dramatically increased its recent spending on internal security, which includes not just combating terrorism but also spying on journalists and dissidents and censoring online communications, such that every year in this decade, it has spent more on domestic “stability maintenance” than on the military. (Domestic security budgets for the legislature, the National People’s Congress, have since 2013 excluded spending by provincial and regional governments—the effect of which is a likely underreporting of total spending by at least 75 percent.)
   
   At the same time, much of the population also gladly participates in its own oppression. Chinese self-censor and comply with all sorts of restrictions as they chase after the higher scores and accompanying prizes of the new social credit system.
   
   One might argue that this is just a stage of development—that, after solidifying their economic gains, the growing middle class will eventually clamor for liberties and protections such as property rights and the rule of law, thus forcing party higher-ups to yield to growing democratic aspirations. This developmental notion is attractive but grossly incomplete. While economic advances play a role, the transformation of potentially comparable countries such as Taiwan and South Korea were driven by a number of other factors, including geopolitical pressures, idiosyncratic leadership (for example, Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui), and religious influences (such as Methodism and Presbyterianism in South Korea), and there is no sign that China’s middle class will propel this liberalizing metamorphosis. The CCP intends this trade-off to be permanent, and the population understands this.
   
   The Price of Progress
   
   Perhaps it is a small price to pay for the massive enrichment of ordinary Chinese people since the late 1980s, which has yielded unquestionable improvements in well-being. One should not read too much into this economic miracle, however. After the upheavals and persecutions of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the country’s economy started from an extremely low base, to say the least, which helped make such rapid growth possible. Not to mention that the growth numbers themselves are suspect, and often invented.
   
   This is not to say that the economic miracle is not real. Millions of ordinary people have been lifted out of poverty, which has conferred tangible benefits in the form of extended life expectancy, expanded education, and improved quality of life for many Chinese—but the “miracle” and China’s status must be put into the proper context.
   
   The biggest factor in China’s present position as an economic powerhouse is its sheer size. Its overall GDP is about the same as that of the Eurozone, but that is achieved with four times the population. Much of China’s newly acquired status as a global economic and military superpower is an inadvertent projection of what it might become, say, 50 years from now if it sustained its astounding rate of growth (averaging 9.63 percent per year from 1989 through 2017). That is scarcely possible, however. And even if it were, China cannot maintain this pace much longer; in fact, as Teng Biao noted, its growth rate has already slowed in recent years. As the economy’s structure changes, as all the easy gains are achieved, its capacity for astounding expansion diminishes. The hard work on China’s economy still remains, and the reality is that the verdict on whether the “Beijing model” can deliver is still a long way away.
   
   What Should the International Community Do?
   
   Given the bleak outlook on China’s present and future, what should be done about this massive human rights debacle? As Teng Biao warns, opportunities for meaningful resistance are rapidly fading. To add to our pessimism, the reality of human history says that successful reforming forces must and should come primarily from within. External shocks such as a sharp global economic downtown or losing an unintended war can spur domestic agitation or revolution, but there are severe limits to what the outside world can do.
   
   This does not, however, necessitate accepting as fact China’s regional dominance, future superpower status, or domestic oppression. First, we should first recognize the nature of China and the CCP: not only the economic reality on the ground but all the state oppression that goes into making the Chinese market so attractive to foreign companies desperate to tap into it. We should also recognize the extent to which the CCP’s foreign policy is driven by domestic developments—not by concern for its people, but rather by the internal stability required to maintain its monopoly on power. Chinese rulers’ freedom from the constraints of political accountability (having to please voters) is not a stage in a theory of liberalizing development; it is meant to be a permanent condition.
   
   Second, all liberal democratic societies (or aspiring ones) should prioritize a foreign policy that is consistent with their domestic values. As I have observed elsewhere, values and principles, including self-interest, do not end at one’s border, and acquiescing to another country’s internal oppression damages one’s own domestic interests.
   
   International accommodation of the CCP is driven by the geopolitical goal of taming a potential adversary and preventing war as much as by the desire to access China’s market and resources. But accommodation will not incentivize the CCP to cooperate. In fact, maintaining the status quo or offering concessions—for example some kind of “grand bargain” involving Taiwan—do the opposite. When the international community sacrifices its own values for the sake of regional and international stability and economic growth, it only tells the CCP that it need not cooperate or reform, as it already gets what it wants by pursuing its current course.
   
   Even as countries prioritize their own self-interest, they must still distinguish between more or less trustworthy partners, between short-term coalitions of convenience and long-term alliances of like-mindedness. In this area, a country’s domestic values and practices are the most telling. While scruples may seem superfluous, even a handicap, in the anarchic world of geopolitics, shared values are not in fact an ethical luxury. Shared values are strategically prudent because there are necessarily few guarantees of reliability in the international realm, and grave dangers in failing to judge one’s partners accurately.
   
   This means calibrating one’s foreign policy to assist the liberal democracies in China’s vicinity—South Korea, Japan, and also Taiwan, which is an existing model of the kind of Confucian democracy that people hope China might one day become. Promoting one’s values abroad is not required in a Westphalian-based system of sovereign states, but the strength of a country’s domestic principles is called into question when they are blatantly disregarded by the same country in its foreign policy. It is the burden of universalistic theories and those aspiring to them to be held to a higher standard.

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