滕彪文集
[主页]->[独立中文笔会]->[滕彪文集]->[Has Xi Jinping Changed China? Not Really]
滕彪文集
·公民月刊:每一个人都可能是历史的转折点
·抵制央视、拒绝洗脑
·公民在行动
·Charter of Democracy
·阳光茅老
·中国“黑监狱”情况让人担忧/路透社
·《关于取缔黑监狱的建议》
·用法律武器保护家园——青岛市河西村民拆迁诉讼代理词
·关于改革看守所体制及审前羁押制度的公民建议书
·仅仅因为他们说了真话
·再审甘锦华 生死仍成谜
·邓玉娇是不是“女杨佳”?
·星星——为六四而作
·I Cannot Give Up: Record of a "Kidnapping"
·Political Legitimacy and Charter 08
·六四短信
·倡议“5•10”作为“公民正当防卫日”
·谁是敌人——回"新浪网友"
·为逯军喝彩
·赠晓波
·正义的运动场——邓玉娇案二人谈
·这六年,公盟做了什么?
·公盟不死
·我们不怕/Elena Milashina
·The Law On Trial In China
·自由有多重要,翻墙就有多重要
·你也会被警察带走吗
·Lawyer’s Detention Shakes China’s Rights Movement
·我来推推推
·许志永年表
·庄璐小妹妹快回家吧
·开江县法院随意剥夺公民的辩护权
·Summary Biography of Xu Zhiyong
·三著名行政法学家关于“公盟取缔事件”法律意见书
·公益诉讼“抑郁症”/《中国新闻周刊》
·在中石化上访
·《零八宪章》与政治正当性问题
·我来推推推(之二)
·我来推推推(之三)
·國慶有感
·我来推推推(之四)
·国庆的故事(系列之一)
·国庆的故事(系列之二)
·
·我来推推推(之五)
·我来推推推(之六)
·净空(小说)
·作为反抗的记忆——《不虚此行——北京劳教调遣处纪实》序
·twitter直播-承德冤案申诉行动
·我来推推推(之七)
·关于我的证言的证言
·我来推推推(之八)
·不只是问问而已
·甘锦华再判死刑 紧急公开信呼吁慎重
·就甘锦华案致最高人民法院死刑复核法官的紧急公开信
·我来推推推(之九)
·DON’T BE EVIL
·我来推推推(之十)
·景德镇监狱三名死刑犯绝食吁国际关注
·江西乐平死刑冤案-向最高人民检察院的申诉材料
·我来推推推(之十一)
·法律人的尊严在于独立
·我来推推推(之十二)
·听从正义和良知的呼唤——在北京市司法局关于吊销唐吉田、刘巍律师证的听证会上的代理意见
·一个思想实验:关于中国政治
·公民维权与社会转型(上)——在北京传知行社会经济研究所的演讲
·公民维权与社会转型——在北京传知行社会经济研究所的演讲(下)
·福州“7•4”奇遇记
·夏俊峰案二审辩护词(新版)
·摄录机打破官方垄断
·敦请最高人民检察院立即对重庆打黑运动中的刑讯逼供问题依法调查的公开信
·为政治文明及格线而奋斗——滕彪律师的维权之路
·“打死挖个坑埋了!”
·"A Hole to Bury You"
·谁来承担抵制恶法的责任——曹顺利被劳动教养案代理词
·国家尊重和保障人权从严禁酷刑开始
·分裂的真相——关于钱云会案的对话
·无国界记者:对刘晓波诽谤者的回应
·有些人在法律面前更平等(英文)
·法律人与法治国家——在《改革内参》座谈会上的演讲
·貪官、死刑與民意
·茉莉:友爱的滕彪和他的诗情
·萧瀚:致滕彪兄
·万延海:想起滕彪律师
·滕彪:被迫走上它途的文學小子/威廉姆斯
·中国两位律师获民主奖/美国之音
·独立知识分子——写给我的兄弟/许志永
·滕彪的叫真/林青
·2011年十大法治事件(公盟版)
·Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Under Assault
·《乱诗》/殷龙龙
·吴英的生命和你我有关
·和讯微访谈•滕彪谈吴英案
·吴英、司法与死刑
·努力走向公民社会(视频访谈)
·【蔡卓华案】胡锦云被诉窝藏赃物罪的二审辩护词
·23岁青年被非法拘禁致死 亲属六年申请赔偿无果
·5月2日与陈光诚的谈话记录
·华邮评论:支持中国说真话者的理由
·中国律师的阴与阳/金融时报
·陈光诚应该留还是走?/刘卫晟
[列出本栏目所有内容]
欢迎在此做广告
Has Xi Jinping Changed China? Not Really

http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/has-xi-jinping-changed-china-not-really
   
   Has Xi Jinping Changed China? Not Really
   April 16, 2018
   Teng Biao

   
   Teng Biao is a Visiting Scholar at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute at New York University, where his research is focused on the rights defense movement in China. Teng previously was a Lecturer at China、、.
   More
   Xi Jinping has had an eventful early spring. After he abolished presidential term limits and was unanimously elected—if it can be called an election—to serve another term in that post, Xi got the world’s attention again by holding a meeting with Kim Jong-un. Xi was also in the spotlight when he addressed the 2018 Boao Forum for Asia, promising more openness in the face of a looming trade war. Many observers now seem convinced that Xi has changed China and maybe, even, the international order. But has he really?
   
   In the 70 years since the establishment of the Communist regime, numerous changes have taken place in the social, economic, legal, and psychological spheres. Yet the Party’s essential political role of leading a Party-state under strict one-Party rule has not changed, whether under collective dictatorship or a personal one. The Party’s absolute control over the military, judicial system, Congress, and bureaucracy, as well as its suppression of dissidents and activists who promote democracy, has been constant for 70 years. The Party’s control over the media, ideology, public opinion, and education—almost all of the public sphere, with the exception of the Internet—has also undergone no fundamental change. The Party also controls the economy, social groups, and religions. And while market economics, some folk activities, rights defenders, and house churches have managed to carve out a tiny space for themselves, they don’t come close to constituting a challenge to the Party. When measured against the basic ingredients of a totalitarian state as described by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Xi Jinping’s new totalitarianism and Mao’s old style of totalitarianism don’t differ by all that much.
   
   This year is the 40th anniversary of China’s “reform and opening” policy. While commonly seen as a key step in China’s modernization on the economic front, what reform and opening has really meant is that for 40 years political elites have colluded with businessmen in a Party-controlled, crony capitalist market economy. Under this kleptocratic system, the assets of regular citizens have never been afforded any institutionalized protection. On the ideological front, the Party has monopolized the media, created no-go zones in scholarship, instituted a brainwashing-style education system, established the Great Firewall, and persecuted intellectuals for their writing. On the legal front, the Party has always ridden roughshod over the law. Black jails, forced disappearances, torture, secret police, surveillance, judicial corruption, controlled elections, forced demolitions, and religious persecution have all been rampant. These abuses are a key element in the Party’s system of control. China’s Constitution on paper makes beautiful-sounding promises for human rights and basic freedoms, including a right to vote, equality, freedom of speech, belief, and association. But it’s clear that the Party’s rule of law is merely an empty promise. The Constitution didn’t guide the Party toward a rule-of-law democracy, but as Stein Ringen, a professor at Oxford, has documented, China is adopting a “sophisticated totalitarianism.” This totalitarianism is strict and refined without being brittle and dogmatic; it’s cruel and barbaric without being chaotic. China’s booming economy, social stability, and apparent popular support for Xi have fooled both the world and most Chinese citizens.
   
   Of course, the abolition of the presidential term limit was something Xi Jinping pushed hard for, but he seems to have had few other options. His first term was spent on anti-corruption campaigns, as well as military reform, purging the Internet, and cooking up a cult of personality, all in order to eliminate opposing voices and centralize power around himself. Eliminating Zhou Yongkang; violating the unwritten rules of immunity for Politburo Standing Committee members; getting rid of two former Central Military Commission vice chairmen; taking out potential successor Sun Zhengcai; abducting one of the major bankers for the Party elite, Xiao Jianhua; assuming control over the Deng Xiaoping-clan-linked Anbang conglomerate—all of this is sure to have sent shockwaves through the Communist Party. The “tigers” who were targets of his anti-corruption campaign of course would hate Xi and plot their revenge. It must have been clear to Xi that if he ever lost power, reprisal would be swift. A system of lifetime rule was the obvious solution.
   
   Peering beneath the surface, to deeper historical trends, it seems that for the Communist Party, as an autocratic system, personal dictatorship is a common means of dealing with crises. The Party faced, on the one hand, an accumulation of post-1989 new social energies—in the form of the Internet, the market, the spread of liberal ideas, the rights defense movement—and on the other hand, official corruption, conflicts between officials and citizens, an ecological crisis, a crisis in social morality, and many other crises. For the past several years, the economic dividends China has been able to harvest from favorable demographics, cheap labor, and globalization have been all but exhausted. Economists predict GDP growth will slow. The Communist Party already eliminated democratization—whether gradual or sudden—from its menu of options for responding to crises. And so all it is left with is strengthening centralized power and enhancing the forces of repression.
   
   From the perspective of the Communist Party itself, turning Xi Jinping—who comes from a “red” revolutionary pedigree and is dedicated to the preservation of the “red” dynasty—into a lifetime leader, may very well be a calculated response to the extremely complex circumstances the Party faces in the near future. In 2013, Xi, in alarm and anger, used the phrase “nobody was man enough to stand up and resist,” in reference to the failure of Soviet leaders to prevent the collapse of their communist regime. Five years later, he is now announcing to the world that he will be the one—the grand helmsman—to seize this key historical moment and save the Chinese Communist Party.
   
   The Party’s technical totalitarianism is already beginning to take shape: networked stability maintenance, big data, facial recognition, DNA collection, Party control of the market, strengthening of the secret police, stoking nationalist sentiment, expanded control of the media and Internet, mass arrests of rights activists, a personality cult around the leader. . . Most of these methods are a gradual expansion of what was already emerging under Hu Jintao: the expansion of secret police capabilities, for instance, was becoming an important component in the Party’s overall control of popular opinion and activism. Put another way, Fascism with Chinese Characteristics is now taking form. One Party, one Führer, one Xi Jinping ideology.
   
   Some have called the constitutional amendment to abolish presidential term limits “turning back history.” But a closer look shows that the Communist Party, since it took power in 1949, has always been heading in the opposite direction of the trend of history—Xi Jinping has simply slammed his foot on the gas pedal. Xi’s rein has really not had as far-reaching an influence on Chinese politics, economy, and society as many claim. The biggest impact of Xi Jinping has been primarily psychological: the Chinese public and intellectuals who still harbor illusions about the Communist Party, friends of the regime, and the “panda huggers” in the West—political leaders and experts alike—who have long carried water for the dictatorship under the false assumption that markets and “engagement” policy would inevitably lead to democratization, are now all at something of a loss.

[下一页]
blog comments powered by Disqus

©Boxun News Network All Rights Reserved.
所有栏目和文章由作者或专栏管理员整理制作,均不代表博讯立场