滕彪文集
[主页]->[独立中文笔会]->[滕彪文集]->[Is China Returning to the Madness of Mao’s Cultural Revolution?]
滕彪文集
·Chinese lawyers hailed as “heroes for justice”
·THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF THE DISAPPEARED
·《失踪人民共和国》
·EXEMPLARY FIGURES REPORTED BY GARIWO
·在劫难逃
·李明哲案 滕彪:陸意圖影響台灣政治籌碼
·人权律师解密北京的"水晶之夜"
·李明哲案:臺灣退無可退
·作为人类精神事件的刘晓波之死
·北京驱逐"低端"人口的制度根源
·Atrocity in the Name of the Law
·学者解析中共执政密码
·暴行,以法律的名义
·人道中国十周年纪录短片
·“中华维权律师协会”评出十佳维权律师
·中国妇权成立十周年纪念
·武统狂言背后的恐懼
·以法律名義被消失,中華失踪人民共和國
·川普公布首批人权恶棍 滕彪:震慑中共
·「蚂蚁金服」在美并购遭拒 中国官媒指不排除反制措施
·CCP is taking China towards more and more Owellian state
·中国公民社会前景:乐观还是堪忧?
·中共渗透遭美欧澳等国谴责 专家析世界格局
·Laogai, le goulag chinois
·不反思計劃生育 中國就沒有未來
·中国:溃败与希望
·Conversation on China’s human right
·Draconic Restrictions on Uyghur Cultural And Religious Freedoms
·寧添十座墳,不添一個人
· the only way seems to become more dictatorial and oppressiv
·不管藍營綠營,面對的都是「集中營
·惠台政策还是经济统战?
·专访:用李明哲案件恐吓整个台湾
·習近平進一步向毛澤
·中共專制政權威脅全世界
·新戊戌变法的变与不变
·【Documentary】China: Spies, Lies and Blackmail
·No escape: The fearful life of China's exiled dissidents
·中国异议人士逃抵西方仍难脱离中共监控威胁
·The State of Human Rights Lawyers in China
·权益组织:电视认罪—一场中国官方导演的大戏
·温良学者 正义卫士(一)
·Has Xi Jinping Changed China? Not Really
·訪滕彪律師談中共政權對於全世界民主自由人權發展的負面影響
·中共绑架中国
·美国务院发布人权报告 点名批评中国等八国
·滕彪,温良学者 正义卫士(二)——发出不同的声音
·鸿茅药酒:中共制度之毒
·on televised confessions
·滕彪,温良学者 正义卫士(三)——挑战恶法 虽败犹荣
·温良学者 正义卫士(四)——铁骨也柔情
·温良学者 正义卫士(五)——黑暗中的闪电
·美两党议员推法案 要求调查中共渗透/NTD
·Video【Teng Biao: From 1989 to 1984】
·第二届藏港台圆桌会 中国律师表态支持自决权
·自由民主與自決權:第二屆藏港台圓桌會議
·Exiled in the U.S., a Lawyer Warns of ‘China’s Long Arm’
·端传媒滕彪专访:一个曾经的依法维权者,怎么看今日中国?
·VOA:川金会上 人权问题真的被忽略了吗?
·“中国的长臂”:滕彪审视西方机构对华自我审查
·中国长臂迫使西方机构公司自我审查/RFA
·美退出人权理事会 滕彪呼吁应将人权与经贸利益挂钩
·“中国政治转变的可能前景”研讨会纪要
·滕彪:川普退出人权理事会是为人权?西藏、新疆民族自决
· The Second China human rights lawyers day
·第二届“中国人权律师节”将于7月8日在纽约举行
·【video】A message from a Chinese human rights lawyer
·【RFA中国热评】美中贸易战、 “七五”、“709案”
·回顾709案:中国迫害律师的第三波高潮
·中国人权律师节力赞人权律师的意义
·高智晟、王全璋获颁首届中国人权律师奖
·Chinese rights lawyers and international support
·高智晟王全璋纽约获人权律师奖 亲友代领
·709大抓捕三周年 境内外纷有声援行动/RFA
·Forced disappearances
·光荣的荆棘路——第二届中国人权律师节开幕短片(Openning film on the Sec
·用法律抗争与对法律宣战
·「709大抓捕」並非偶然…
·An Editor Speaks Out: Teng Biao, Darkness Before Dawn, and ABA
·中國假疫苗事件能夠杜絕?
·当局不解决人们提出的问题,而是〝解决〞提出问题的人们
·疫苗之殇还是贼喊捉贼/RFA
·The legal system is a battleground, and there’s no turning back
·A Call for a UN Investigation, and US Sanctions, on the Human Rights D
·关注新疆维吾尔自治区人权灾难的呼吁书
·警察街头扫描手机内容 新疆式维稳监控扩散
·The banned religious group that has China worried
·人间蒸发 强制失踪受害者日 家属焦急寻人
·中国留学生都是“007”?
·忧末日恐慌蔓延,中国围剿全能神教
·An Open Letter on Ilham Tohti’s Life
·关于伊力哈木生命致多国政府和欧盟理事会的公开信
·918 RESIST Xi Jinping
·公安部拟新规“维护”警察权威
·The United Nations, China, and Human Rights
·司法部整顿律师业:统统姓党
·美中媒体战?中国在美两大官媒被要求登记为外国代理
· Alphabet City Q&A with Teng Biao
·The Xinjiang Initiative
·无权者也是有力量的/RFA
·欧洲议会通过议案 促中共关闭新疆「集中营」
[列出本栏目所有内容]
欢迎在此做广告
Is China Returning to the Madness of Mao’s Cultural Revolution?

By Teng Biao
   
   https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/16/is-china-returning-to-the-madness-of-maos-cultural-revolution/
   
   The song most representative of China’s Cultural Revolution — the 10-year period between 1966 and 1976 of anarchy and anti-authority mania, where students tortured their teachers, employees denounced their bosses, and children murdered their parents — is “The East Is Red.” A simple yet catchy song about the brilliance of Chairman Mao Zedong, “The East Is Red” is an unofficial anthem of that decade; it articulated the brainwashed love people felt for the chairman. “The sun is rising. From China comes Mao Zedong,” the song lyrics go. “[Mao] strives for people’s happiness. Hurrah, he is the people’s great savior!”

   
   But over the last few months, a modern version of the song has been bouncing around the Internet. Titled “The East Is Red Again,” it proclaims with modified lyrics: “The sun again rises, and Xi Jinping succeeds Mao Zedong. He’s striving for the people’s rejuvenation. Hurrah, he is the people’s great lucky star!” And even though censors deleted mentions of the song on the Chinese Internet, Xi has not repudiated the comparison. Indeed, an early May concert at Beijing’s massive legislative building, the Great Hall of the People, featured a performance celebrating “red,” or Communist, songs, including “Socialism Is Good” and “Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China.” Because of their popularity during the Cultural Revolution, these songs, and the act of playing them, now glorify that horrifically tumultuous era, which began 50 years ago on May 16.
   
   
   Sadly, the celebration of red songs is not the only similarity between Chinese politics today and in 1966. This March, during the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress, an important gathering of the ruling Chinese Communist Party, the delegation from Tibet wore badges showing Xi’s face. During the Cultural Revolution, people didn’t leave their houses without Mao badges. Like Mao, Xi has purged his political enemies through mass anti-corruption campaigns. Xi has strengthened the party’s control over the media and official ideology through the internal party communiqué Document No. 9, which warned about the dangers of press freedom. He also emphasized the need for patriotism in creative works during an influential October 2014 speech he delivered to important artists and propaganda officials.
   
   Xi has also resurrected the calcified, blindly pro-Communist discourse of the Mao era; he regularly exhorts cadres to participate in “mass line” campaigns, a hazily defined concept, and to “bare their blades in the ideological struggle.”Xi has also resurrected the calcified, blindly pro-Communist discourse of the Mao era; he regularly exhorts cadres to participate in “mass line” campaigns, a hazily defined concept, and to “bare their blades in the ideological struggle.” The anti-vice campaign — reminiscent of Mao’s mania for mass movements — that began in February 2014 in the southern city of Dongguan and spread throughout the country is yet another example of Xi’s Maoist madness.
   
   In some ways, it feels like Xi is trying to turn back time and relive the Cultural Revolution, where the party reigned supreme and invaded every aspect of Chinese life. Luckily, he can’t, for China and the world are different now. Even if Xi wanted to, he could never realize Mao’s Cultural Revolution-era disregard for all laws, human and holy, nor could he create a pervasive cult of personality. Mao was history’s harshest despot, its greatest persecutor of humanity. But he wouldn’t have been able to persecute hundreds of millions of Chinese people without the historical background, social structure, ideological framework, and international environment of mid-20th-century China.
   
   After Mao’s 1976 death, the party gradually settled on a system of collective dictatorship in which a small group of leaders rule for two five-year terms. Although the party operates above the law and seemingly without any effective restriction, there are internal disagreements and even power struggles among members at the highest levels. Moreover, there are divisions between the central leadership and local governments, which push back against orders from above. This so-called “local tyranny” poses a great obstacle to Xi’s campaign to deify himself.
   
   The Cultural Revolution saw the mobilization of hundreds of millions of people — into opposing, often warring factions — the complete destruction of China’s legal system, and the deaths of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people. That is also entirely different from today. While there is a widening wealth gap between the rich and the poor, mass mobilization is a thing of the past. Although totalitarianism makes an occasional appearance, today’s China has a legal system that performs better than the chaos-riven courts of the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, the arrests of high-level officials and political dissidents are at least packaged in legal terms and implemented through ostensibly legal procedures. And the violence present in Chinese society today is on a much smaller scale than in the 1960s and 1970s.
   
   But if one defines the Cultural Revolution by its strict one-party rule, total control of the media, thought control, religious oppression, and suppression of dissent, then today differs only in degree. Xi has adopted a zero-tolerance policy toward political opposition and grassroots rights defense movements. Since Xi assumed power in late 2012, hundreds, if not thousands, of human rights defenders have been imprisoned. Civil society organizations like the pro-constitutionalism New Citizens’ Movement have been suppressed, and more than 300 human rights lawyers have been detained or intimidated. Many NGOs have been shut down; thousands of Christian crosses have been forcibly removed; Christian churches have been destroyed; and practitioners of small religious groups such as Falun Gong have been persecuted. Feminist activists, defenders of labor rights, Internet celebrities, and journalists who have dared to speak out have all been attacked.
   
   Meanwhile, in the name of “counterterrorism,” Xi has cracked down on the people of Xinjiang and Tibet, even imposing martial law in parts of those regions. In Hong Kong, he has delayed honoring Beijing’s promise of universal suffrage and suppressed the protest movement known as the Umbrella Revolution. Xi has implemented the imperial tactic of punishing an individual’s entire family for the acts of that individual, detaining Mainland China-based family members of overseas Chinese activists and using them as political hostages. And in complete disrespect for basic, internationally recognized human rights, Swedish bookseller Gui Minhai was kidnapped from Thailand and forcibly transported to China — all because he was connected to a book about Xi’s romantic history.
   
   But could the Cultural Revolution happen again in China? I don’t think so.But could the Cultural Revolution happen again in China? I don’t think so. The biggest difference between now and then is that Chinese people no longer bestow the party with the legitimacy it would need to implement such a campaign. Xi doesn’t control the Chinese people as tightly as Mao did — nor does Xi command the same loyalty, respect, and love. The 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, where members of the Chinese military slaughtered hundreds of unarmed student protestors, greatly reduced the party’s basis for rule. The authorities, knowing all too well the severity of their crimes, downplayed the matter and attempted to force the people to forget about it as well. Eventually, the party censored and forbade even the most oblique of references to the massacre. Over the last few decades, because of pervasive corruption, the forced demolition of many people’s homes, air pollution, forced abortions, and religious persecution, among other ills, dissatisfaction with the party has grown. The Internet and social media have helped to organize this dissatisfaction and resistance.

[下一页]
blog comments powered by Disqus

©Boxun News Network All Rights Reserved.
所有栏目和文章由作者或专栏管理员整理制作,均不代表博讯立场