[发表评论] [查看此文评论]    滕彪文集
[主页]->[独立中文笔会]->[滕彪文集]->[Political Legitimacy and Charter 08]
滕彪文集
·Don’t Aid and Abet China’s Surveillance State
·在台北616“反送中”集會上的演講
·湖南“校园操场埋尸案”揭示了什么?
·TIBET CAMPAIGNERS LAUD SUCCESS AFTER GOOGLE CONFIRMS: “NO PLANS TO OF
·Teng Biao’s Statement at a media briefing against Google’s Project D
·香港「一國兩制」為何變了調?
·从天安门到香港
·short-term benefits vs. universal values
·Censorship is closing China's young minds
·江天勇李文足連線台北 感謝關注中國律師處境
·臺律師人權界聲援為法輪功辯護六律師
·「綏靖政策」與「惠台政策」的反思
·第三屆中國人權律師節 唐荊陵獲獎
·第二届中国人权律师奖颁奖辞
·「709事件」四週年 中國法治嚴重滑坡
·709四周年:中国法治恶化 香港反弹
· 709大抓捕对维权律师是一个“清洗”
·"Alle sind vorsichtiger geworden"
·中共用校園“七不講”窒息年輕人
·【30張影像、30個故事 — 六四30週年座談會】
·中共的网络主权论与世界人权宣言
·中共指使黑帮祸害香港
·外國企業在中國助紂為虐應充分重視
·新疆模式扩大 粤公安采集「口水样本」 监控时代 2.0来临
·Guangdong Police Take Saliva Samples Amid Fears of Nationwide DNA Prog
·人权活动家接受自由之家采访 见证法轮功反迫害20年历程
·香港下一步 可能從打人變成打死人
·追寻高智晟
·“The Bravest Lawyer in China” – Gao Zhisheng
·L’AVOCAT LE PLUS COURAGEUX DE CHINE
·人權律師建議 以2022北京冬奧向中共施壓
·反送中與六四
·大陆网军抹黑香港示威者 推特和脸书暂停大量中国帐号
·"Ce totalitarisme high tech est sans précédent"
·Disparitions forcées en Chine : un système rodé et institutionnalis
·Disappearing in China
·中共或採取化整為零的屠殺方式嚇退香港抗爭者
·Cambridge Forum 911
· ‘I thought they might kill me’
·China: Arrests, Disappearances Require International Response/HRW
·报道香港抗议持「中共立场」 中国环球电视网遭英监管机构调查
·"El régimen dictatorial de China no durará mucho más"
·The West needs 'collective action' to push China on human rights: expe
·在茉莉花电视谈 “中国国难与香港抗争”
·禁蒙面法会不会让暴力升级?“一国一制”正在悄然实行?
·香港危局破解 中国高科技极权主义
·Decoding the cracks in the Chinese model
·大陆民族情绪泛滥 《灌篮高手》作者挺港运遭网民封杀/RFA
·中共有关香港抗议的宣传战略及局限
·国庆还是国难
·關於香港事態的緊急聲明
·香港运动延烧 大陆人发声为何那么难?
·Newts World: China's rule
·伊力哈木 - 无法祝贺的生日与萨哈罗夫奖
·Tiananmen Massacre, the China Model and the formation of China’s Hig
·茉莉:专制下的“黑色花卉”
·比利时一孔子学院院长涉间谍行为 被禁进入比利时和申根区
·Broken Harmony: China’s Dissidents
·香港廢青與中國小粉紅
·柏林墙的倒塌与“信息柏林墙”的建立
·Panopticism with Chinese Characteristics
·当今中国禁忌话题:猪瘟、猪头、习近平领导能力/VOA
·哥大取消中国人权研讨会
·FREE SPEECH IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES UNDER ATTACK FROM BEIJING
·懼於中國「粉紅軍團」威脅抗議 哥倫比亞大學取消講座
·Columbia U. cancels panel on Communist China’s human rights violation
·Columbia U. Canceled an Event on Chinese Human-Rights Violations. Orga
·人大怒斥香港高院 司法还能独立吗?/VOA
·Why did Columbia cancel Chinese rights violations event?
·The Pros and Cons of US Universities Operating Campuses and Centers in
·中国打组合拳反制美国 美国NGO躺枪
·美国大学生指控「抖音」海外版 窃取用户数据并传回中国
·国际人权日:不放弃的香港青年示威者
· Ilham Tohti's Sakhrov Prize 2019
· 中共为什么要举办世界律师大会
·“世界律师大会”:对法律与人权的嘲讽
·台湾大选是对中国政府的公投?
·瑞典国会议员要求将中国驻瑞典大使桂从友驱逐出境
·A New Online Game Allows Players to Attack Hong Kong’s Protestors
·花千芳为母维权引群嘲 中共养老金无底洞再聚焦
·大陆被指干预「台湾总统大选」 背后支持台商投票「机票补贴」
·桂从友大使又口舌招尤  瑞典再掀驱逐浪潮
·中國海外人士觀選團來台 爆拜訪韓國瑜陣營被拒絕
·民主已深入生活 憂兩岸敵意變深
·中國維權運動這條路 三博士三款命
·“假孔子之名”放映 高市议员正视红色渗透
·消失第七天 习近平去哪儿了?
·35美国议员狙击中共「大外宣」 要求司法部调查《中国日报》
·大数据监控疫情 未来维稳大操练?/VOA
·美国司法部再诉华为及孟晚舟 偷窍技术及协助独裁国家实施监控
·61国际学者致习近平公开信  劝还「言论自由」于民
·中共借抗击疫情强化对社会的全面监控
·疫情過後 中國異議人士處境將更艱難
·China's 10-year sentence for Hong Kong bookseller 'extremely brutal'
·许志永因劝习退位被以“煽颠”罪秘密拘押
·China activist who called Xi clueless on coronavirus faces years in ja
·武汉肺炎与治理失灵
·中国奇迹与治理溃败
·Teng Biao Examines Human Rights In China
·Biao Teng on China Human Rights Movements
·中聯部發言人首條推文宣揚「人類健康共同體」 開局不利成大外宣「翻車現場
[列出本栏目所有内容]
欢迎在此做广告
Political Legitimacy and Charter 08


   Teng Biao
   
   China Rights Forum 2009
   

   http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/article?revision%5fid=169465&item%5fid=169464#bk27
   
   
   What establishes a regime’s legitimacy? How can it justify its rule without the explicit consent of the people or their political participation? Can an improved standard of living for the people of China alone solve the question of legitimacy for the Communist Party of China? And for how long? Teng Biao, a rights defense lawyer, explores these questions, recognizing Charter 08 as a historical document from an emerging Chinese civil society that questions the legitimacy of its government.
   1.
   Is the existing system ethical? On what [grounds] does power base its rule?Why do I comply? These are core propositions in political studies and questions that humanity, that political animal, never ceases to press. The answers to these questions touch upon the concept of political legitimacy. As we evaluate phenomena such as identity, resistance movements, system change, and human rights violations, we cannot escape this concept.
   
   Legitimacy is something political systems do well to acknowledge. The concept has developed throughout history.As distinguished by Patrick Riley,1 from the 17th and 18th centuries on, the foundation of political legitimacy is no longer built on “patriarchy, theocracy, divine right, the natural superiority of one’s betters, the naturalness of political life, necessity, custom, convenience, psychological compulsion or any other basis,” but must be based on consent, sanction and voluntary individual behavior. Under the impact of modernity, the only source of legality for a regime nowadays is the endorsement of its power through methods such as elections and voting.
   
   Max Weber2 theorizes three bases of human obedience: habit, emotion, and rational calculation; and correspondingly, three types of legitimacy: traditional, charismatic, and legal. Zhao Dingxin3 believes that legitimacy is a dynamic relational concept. He bases this on popular and elite perceptions of national legitimacy, dividing legitimacy into the legal-electoral type, the effective performance type, and the ideological type. This gives rise to the question of whether economic development, social stability, improvements in people’s livelihood, and other [measures of] regime performance can bestow legitimacy on a regime that has never experienced a democratic election. Is legitimacy based on past [performance] or does it have a future orientation?
   
   Hannah Arendt,4 in her On Violence, was the first to draw a distinction between legitimacy and justification. Similarly, in his Political Man, Seymour M. Lipset5 distinguished legitimacy and validity; in The Third Wave, Samuel Huntington6 distinguished performance legitimacy from procedural legitimacy; and A. John Simmons7 made an even clearer theoretical distinction between legitimacy and justification. Consider a hypothetical case: Woman A is sold to B as a wife by a trafficker in human beings. Suppose that before her marriage A was looking for a mate. Suppose further that B is very kind to A and that A feels he is a model husband. Can we then say that his action in buying a wife has legitimate? First, “legitimacy” is concerned with the origins of power: B, in the absence of A’s consent, has no legitimacy. Second, B’s action is good for A, and is in fact what A needs, and is thus rational or “justified.” But such justification cannot be retroactively converted into “legitimacy.”
   
   2.
   Ever since its establishment in 1949, the Chinese Communist regime has been facing the issue of legality. Beginning with the 1954 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, all the preambles to the Constitution were in fact various kinds of declarations of its legitimacy. They reviewed historical events and summed up the laws and objectives of history in order to establish legitimacy of Communist Party of China (CPC) rule. This sort of crudely simplistic method of dealing with history was nothing but an attempt to establish legitimacy [based] on the natural superiority of certain exceptional organizations (the vanguard of the proletariat) and certain historical inevitabilities (the inevitable appearance of communism), but actually none of this could cover up Mao Zedong’s plain statement that “Political power comes out of the barrel of a gun.” Even if their descriptions and elucidations of the events in modern Chinese history were true and neutral, they still had no way of inferring the laws and objectives of history. The barrel of a gun may be able to produce political power, but it cannot produce its legitimacy.
   
   The barrel of a gun may be able to produce political power, but it cannot produce its legitimacy.Doomed to lack legitimacy, a totalitarian system can only rely on violence and ideology, on one political movement after another, and on the mobilization of the entire population to maintain its rule. This type of rule experienced a crisis in the late 1970s, when the authorities had no other option but to embark on moderate reform and opening up of the economic and social sphere to ease the crisis and attempt to re-establish “legitimacy.” Rulers are convinced that as long as the economy soars and the people’s standard of living continues to rise, they can gain acceptance from the people, continue to suppress freedom and human rights, and continue to maintain a one-party dictatorship. As illustrated [by the example] above, even if the basic human rights were guaranteed and the people’s standard of living had risen, the rulers would achieve “justification” at the most, not “legitimacy.” When there is only lame economic reform that does not touch on the political, not only is there no guarantee for the basic human rights, but the economic and social sphere will be faced with increasingly serious problems as well.
   
   In the late 1970s, there was the policy of openness; in the mid 1990s, it was the socialist market economy. During the past 30 years the economy has indeed made great strides and the standard of living for the majority of the nation’s people has risen remarkably. But there have been no achievements to boast of when it comes to the political system. To this very day, China continues to practice strict one-party dictatorship. Forming associations of a political nature is strictly forbidden. There are no independent trade unions or peasant associations. There is no freedom of assembly, no freedom to hold protest marches, demonstrations, or strikes. There is no freedom of information, and expression of political views is subject to prior vetting. China ranks first in the world in the number of those convicted of speech crimes.8 There is no judicial independence; the Chinese Communist Party controls trials of important cases. There is no freedom of belief; house churches and other religious groups are suppressed, and Falun Gong has been designated a cult and subjected to exceedingly brutal persecution. There is no freedom of movement; the household registration system has turned farmers into second-class citizens. There is no universal suffrage; even the village committee and township elections were run by the government and the corruption was rife. The administration of finance is not public; taxpayers have no oversight of finances. The military does not answer to the state; the Party firmly controls the army. There is widespread violation of human rights, and dissidents, rights defenders, petitioners, and ethnic minorities are subjected to an even greater systematic suppression.
   
   Economic achievement is a superficial phenomenon. To begin with, such development has actually been based on the uncontrolled plundering by powerful officials, creating a huge gap between the rich and the poor and social inequity, a growing sense of deprivation among the people, and aggravated dissatisfaction toward government officials and toward the entire system. The 2006 World Bank report stated that 70 percent of China’s wealth was controlled by 0.4 percent of the population. Annual incomes among the specially privileged official strata are 8–25 times those of the average income of urban residents, and 25–85 times those of local farmers. Upwards of 90 percent of multimillionaires are the sons and daughters of high officials. The Gini coefficient for China long ago exceeded the internationally recognized warning line,making China the nation with the widest gap and most seriously inequitable distribution between rich and poor.9 Furthermore,minimizing human rights and minimizing guarantees is a tactic of economic development, and what the soaring economy has brought in its wake is a proliferation of wrongful imprisonment, an accumulation of grievances among the populace, and the inability of the broad masses of farmers and migrant workers to share equally in the fruits of social progress. Land appropriation and relocations, miscarriages of justice, [forced] birth control, etc., have kept the number of petitions for government redress at an all-time high. The number of mass incidents is rapidly rising: from 58,000 in 2003 to 74,000 in 2004, to a high of over 87,000 in 2005.10 The official number for 2006 was 73,000, but the actual number was, I’m afraid, higher.11 The scale and impact of mass incidents is also on the increase. For example, the Hanyuan incident in Sichuan in 2004;12 the Dingzhou murders in Hebei13 and Dongzhou murders in Shanwei Prefecture, Guangdong14 in 2005; clashes between police and people in Lingyuan, Liaoning in 200615 and Foshan, Guangdong in 2007;16 and clashes with officials in 2008 in Weng’an,17 Menglian,18 Jishou,19 and Longnan,20 as well as the March 14 incident in Tibet21 that reverberated around the globe. Finally, uncontrolled plundering by powerful officials has caused serious damage to natural resources, rapid worsening of the environment, and a decline in social morality. Political fear, education that keeps people ignorant, and consumerism have resulted in a prevalence of insensitivity, indifference, and cynicism, while knowledge, culture, and art have suffered.

[下一页]

©Boxun News Network All Rights Reserved.
所有栏目和文章由作者或专栏管理员整理制作,均不代表博讯立场