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纽约时报社评:中国的爱国小将们

纽约时报社评:中国的爱国小将们
   
   China’s Loyal Youth
   Matthew Forney

   MANY sympathetic Westerners view Chinese society along the lines of what they saw in the waning days of the Soviet Union: a repressive government backed by old hard-liners losing its grip to a new generation of well-educated, liberal-leaning sophisticates. As pleasant as this outlook may be, it’s na?ve. Educated young Chinese, far from being embarrassed or upset by their government’s human-rights record, rank among the most patriotic, establishment-supporting people you’ll meet.
   As is clear to anyone who lives here, most young ethnic Chinese strongly support their government’s suppression of the recent Tibetan uprising. One Chinese friend who has a degree from a European university described the conflict to me as “a clash between the commercial world and an old aboriginal society.” She even praised her government for treating Tibetans better than New World settlers treated Native Americans.
   It’s a rare person in China who considers the desires of the Tibetans themselves. “Young Chinese have no sympathy for Tibet,” a Beijing human-rights lawyer named Teng Biao told me. Mr. Teng — a Han Chinese who has offered to defend Tibetan monks caught up in police dragnets — feels very alone these days. Most people in their 20s, he says, “believe the Dalai Lama is trying to split China.”
   Educated young people are usually the best positioned in society to bridge cultures, so it’s important to examine the thinking of those in China. The most striking thing is that, almost without exception, they feel rightfully proud of their country’s accomplishments in the three decades since economic reforms began. And their pride and patriotism often find expression in an unquestioning support of their government, especially regarding Tibet.
   The most obvious explanation for this is the education system, which can accurately be described as indoctrination. Textbooks dwell on China’s humiliations at the hands of foreign powers in the 19th century as if they took place yesterday, yet skim over the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and ’70s as if it were ancient history. Students learn the neat calculation that Chairman Mao’s tyranny was “30 percent wrong,” then the subject is declared closed. The uprising in Tibet in the late 1950s, and the invasion that quashed it, are discussed just long enough to lay blame on the “Dalai clique,” a pejorative reference to the circle of advisers around Tibet’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama.
   Then there’s life experience — or the lack of it — that might otherwise help young Chinese to gain a perspective outside the government’s viewpoint. Young urban Chinese study hard and that’s pretty much it. Volunteer work, sports, church groups, debate teams, musical skills and other extracurricular activities don’t factor into college admission, so few participate. And the government’s control of society means there aren’t many non-state-run groups to join anyway. Even the most basic American introduction to real life — the summer job — rarely exists for urban students in China.
   Recent Chinese college graduates are an optimistic group. And why not? The economy has grown at a double-digit rate for as long as they can remember. Those who speak English are guaranteed good jobs. Their families own homes. They’ll soon own one themselves, and probably a car too. A cellphone, an iPod, holidays — no problem. Small wonder the Pew Research Center in Washington described the Chinese in 2005 as “world leaders in optimism.”
   As for political repression, few young Chinese experience it. Most are too young to remember the Tiananmen massacre of 1989 and probably nobody has told them stories. China doesn’t feel like a police state, and the people young Chinese read about who do suffer injustices tend to be poor — those who lost homes to government-linked property developers without fair compensation or whose crops failed when state-supported factories polluted their fields.
   Educated young Chinese are therefore the biggest beneficiaries of policies that have brought China more peace and prosperity than at any time in the past thousand years. They can’t imagine why Tibetans would turn up their noses at rising incomes and the promise of a more prosperous future. The loss of a homeland just doesn’t compute as a valid concern.
   Of course, the nationalism of young Chinese may soften over time. As college graduates enter the work force and experience their country’s corruption and inefficiency, they often grow more critical. It is received wisdom in China that people in their 40s are the most willing to challenge their government, and the Tibet crisis bears out that observation. Of the 29 ethnic-Chinese intellectuals who last month signed a widely publicized petition urging the government to show restraint in the crackdown, not one was under 30.
   Barring major changes in China’s education system or economy, Westerners are not going to find allies among the vast majority of Chinese on key issues like Tibet, Darfur and the environment for some time. If the debate over Tibet turns this summer’s contests in Beijing into the Human Rights Games, as seems inevitable, Western ticket-holders expecting to find Chinese angry at their government will instead find Chinese angry at them.
   Matthew Forney, a former Beijing bureau chief for Time, is writing a book about raising his family in China.
   (译者不详)
   很多西方人仍然抱着一种同情的眼光审视中国社会:一群死忠派支持政府施行的苛政,却逐渐失去了对受过教育、渴望民主的新生一代的掌控力,一如已然消逝远去的前苏联。这种观点或许令人愉快,但却是幼稚的。事实上受过教育的年轻中国人
   不会为他们政府的人权纪录感到丝毫窘迫或者不安,相反他们却是你所能见的最为热爱自己国家、支持政府的一群人。
     
     正如我们在这里明显看到的,绝大多数中国年轻人坚定地支持政府镇压西藏义。一位拥有欧洲某大学学历的中国朋友这样形容这场冲突:“这是一个商品经济世界和古老的土著社会的碰撞”。她甚至赞扬中国政府在对待西藏问题上优于当年美洲定居者对待印第安人。
     
     在中国,极少有人会考虑西藏本身的诉求。“年轻中国人缺乏对西藏的同情心”,一位北京的人权律师如是说。滕彪先生--一位为逮捕的藏族僧侣辩护的汉族律师这些天颇感孤独。他说, 20岁左右的中国人普遍相信,达来喇叭分裂中国。
     
     受过教育的年轻人通常是最易沟通文化差异的群体,因此了解他们的想法是极为重要。在中国,最令人震惊的事实是,年轻人几乎毫无例外地为国家在过去三十年内取得的经济成就感到由衷的骄傲。这种骄傲和爱国情绪通常表现在毫无保留地支持自己的政府,特别是在西藏上。
     
     对此最显而易见的原因是根植于中国的教育系统,准确来说,这就是一个灌输体制。教科书着重渲染了中国自19世纪以来在外国强权下所受的屈辱,好像这些事就发生在昨天,但却草草略过6、70年代的文化大革命,好像这是远古的历史。学生们对于毛主席的暴政学到的是一个粗略的计算:“七分功劳,三分过错”,仅此而已。1950年代西藏义以及其后镇压它的入侵都被描绘成归咎于达来喇叭个西藏神领袖还有一个相当轻蔑的称号:“达来喇叭小撮分子”。
     
     另一方面的原因则是中国年轻人所缺乏的生活经历,这些经历可以使他们的想法有别于政府观点。城市里的年轻人所要关心的只是努力学习。义工、运动、教会活动、辩论、音乐以及其他课余项目对于进入大学没有任何帮助,所以很少有人参与。此外由于政府对于教育的控制,很少有非国有机构能够涉足这一领域。甚至在美国被视为对于体验真实生活至关重要的暑期工作在中国也十分罕见。
     
     现在的中国大学毕业生是十分乐观的一个群体。他们何以不乐观呢?经济从他们记事起就以两位数增长。会说英语使他们通常获得更好的职位,他们的父母拥有房产,他们也即将拥有属于自己的。手机、iPOD、休假--统统没问题。华盛顿的一家研究中心称2005年的中国人是“世界乐观主义的领袖”。
     
     至于政治压迫,很少有年轻人体验过。他们多数人太过年轻,根本不记得1987+2年的**门屠/杀,可能也从未有人向他们提起过这个故事。中国已经不是很像一个极权国家了,年轻人所能读到的那些受到不公正待遇的人通常都是穷人,他们有的出让自己的家园于与政府相关的开发活动,却不能从中得到应有的补偿;有的则在国有工厂的污染下在自己的土地上颗粒无收。
     
     因此这些受过教育的年轻人才是最大的既得利益者,现行的政策给中国带来了数千年来未有的和平与繁荣。他们无法想象为何西藏对自己的美好未来起义反抗。似乎被剥夺家园丝毫不是一个值得考量的因素。

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